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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the court by §78-2a~3(j),
U.C.A. This appeal is from a final order, dated October 4,
1989, of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah striking motions to enforce, set aside or
reform a stipulation and judgment. Notice of appeal was
filed October 26, 1989. On February 27, 1990, this case was
transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT I
CHIPMAN'S MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE OR TO REFORM THE
STIPULATION AND JUDGMENT WERE PROPERLY FILED UNDER RULE
60(b)(5),(6) OR (7) AND WERE FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE
TIME.
POINT II
RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT IS ALSO AVAILABLE UNDER RULE 60(a)
"AT ANY TIME."
POINT III
THE COURT HAS INHERENT POWER TO SET ASIDE OR REFORM THE
JUDGMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ADMINISTERING JUSTICE.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Because the lower court concluded it did not have
jurisdiction to consider the motions filed, the facts on
which those motions are based must be taken as true and
there is no dispute of facts. The issues involved present
only questions of interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and, perhaps, of documents alleged to constitute
-iv-

Statutes and Rules to be Interpreted
CONTINUED:

an agreement between the parties. These are questions of
law. This court is to review the lower court's decision
only for correctness, without according any deference
thereto. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989); Madsen
v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988); Asay v. Watkins. 751
P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988); Neilson v. Neilson. 780 P.2d 1264
(Utah App. 1989).
STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
Utah Code Annotated
§25-5-3

Leases and contracts for interest in lands.

Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than
one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in
lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized in writing.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 1.

General provisions.

(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, the
circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state of Utah
in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature,
whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special
statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules
promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and
except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments,
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may
be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the
appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.

-v-

Statutes and Rules to be Interpreted
CONTINUED:

(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any
cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the
judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken* A motion under this
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment
or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be
by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.

-vi-
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COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DENNIS J. RICHINS and
SUESANN RICHINS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
vs.
DELBERT CHIPMAN & SONS CO.,
INC. and D. RAY CHIPHAN,
individually,

Case No. 90-0134-CA

Defendants-Appellants•
vs.
RICHARD PORTER and
KENNETH PORTER,
Defendants-Appellees.

APPELLANTS* BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs Dennis J* and Suesann Richins (hereinafter
referred to as "Richins") filed a complaint alleging that a
verbal sale and lease agreement had been entered into between
Richins and

Defendant Delbert

Chipman

(hereinafter referred to as "Chipman").

& Sons Co., Inc.
At trial, after

Richins presented their evidence and rested their case, a
stipulation was read into the record by Richins1 attorney.
That stipulation, and the written stipulation and judgment
1

which followed it, were inconsistent, ambiguous and incomplete
as well as unfair to Chipman to the point of unconscionability
and the stipulation was not explained to, understood by, nor
agreed to by Chipman.

Chipman filed alternative motions to

enforce termination of this stipulation for default, to set
aside the stipulation because the minds of the parties had not
met and the stipulation was incomplete, unconscionable and
unenforceable, or to reform the stipulation to eliminate
ambiguities and unconscionability.

Richins filed a motion to

strike Chipmanfs motion for lack of jurisdiction.

Disposition in the Lower Court
The lower court granted Richins1 motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that Chipman's motions
were not filed within three months of the date of the judgment
as required by Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This appeal from that order was filed because Chipman believes
its motions fall within Rules 60(b) (5) , (6) or (7) , Rule 60(a)
or is otherwise outside the three-months restriction of Rule
60(b)(1).

Statement of Facts
On or about October 30, 1986, Dennis J. Richins and D.
Ray Chipman met in the office of James R. Brown, Richins1
attorney, to discuss the sale of some grazing permits and the
lease of some property from Chipman to Richins.

2

Chipman

verbally agreed to sell one grazing permit and to lease for
one year other property held by his corporation ("Chipman")
(R.75-6, 51; 222, 516). Richins was to pay $40,000.00 for the
permit and $3,000.00 towards the lease that day (Exh. #7,
R.ll, lines 14-18) and Mr. Brown was to prepare a written
agreement to be signed by the parties later.

Although Mr.

Brown eventually prepared an agreement (R.7-18), it did not
reflect the actual agreement of the parties and it was never
signed by the parties and, incidentally, never offered in
evidence at the trial.

On May 6, 1987, Richins filed a

complaint asserting that he had an agreement for the sale of
four grazing permits and a ten-year lease on other property
held by Chipman

and attached

the unsigned

evidence of that agreement (R.l-19).

agreement as

Chipman filed an Answer

and Counterclaim denying that anything other than a sale of
one permit and a one-year lease had been agreed upon and
seeking a judgment for the remaining $45,000.00 due on the
one-year lease (R.74-76).
At the trial on December 21, 1987, Richins presented his
evidence and rested his case

(R.604).

No evidence was

presented to the court by Chipman or Porters, the other
defendants.

After a recess, a stipulation was stated to the

court by Richins1 attorney (R.504-515). That stipulation was
not explained to, understood by, nor agreed to by Chipman
(R.219, 553, 4 & 5) .

In fact, he expressly told the court

that he did not understand it (R.512, lines 10-15) . A written

3

Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment was signed by the
attorneys for the parties and filed on January 6, 1988 (R.202206) and a Judgment signed by the court the same day (R.207209) . Both the Stipulation and the Judgment refer to Exhibits
M fl

A

which were not attached.

Those exhibits were supposedly

the agreement between the parties.
Chipman was not effectively represented by its attorney
because it is believed he was under the influence of alcohol
during the proceedings on December 21, 1987 (R. 220-1, ^8 & 10;
R. 296-7, 55) • That fact becomes evident when the consequences
of the stipulation are compared to the total damages sought by
Richins. The total damages claimed by Richins, without regard
to the believability

of his evidence and

countervailing

evidence which would have been presented by Chipman, was
$130,643.00 (Exh.18).

That would have been the maximum loss

Chipman would have suffered if it had presented no evidence at
all and the court had believed Richins1 evidence in full* The
stipulation
Settlement

stated
and

to

the

Judgment,

court,

and

the

the

Stipulation

Judgment

itself

for
are

inconsistent, ambiguous, confusing (in many particulars) and
incomplete

(in that

the

real

property

involved

is not

adequately described) but when the amounts to be paid to
Chipman thereunder are totaled up, they reduce the amount to
be paid to Chipman under the agreement which Richins asserted
was the agreement between the parties (R.7-18) by a minimum of
$219,680.00 and a maximum of $281,330.00.

4

This is a minimum

of $89,037.00 and a maximum of $150,687.00 more than the
$130,643.00 in damages claimed by Richins.

They also commit

Chipmanfs property to Richins for ten years.
The stipulation provided

that Richins would pay to

Chipman $15,700.00 on April 15 and December 15 of 1988 and
each year thereafter, with a possible deduction of $5,765.00
from each installment.

None of those installments have been

paid by Richins to Chipman (R.223, 521).
Mr. Chipman attempted several times following the trial
to get an explanation

from his attorney as to what had

happened and what could be done to get the property back or to
get Richins to pay for the use of it.

No explanation was

given to him and each time he was told that nothing could be
done about it (R.221, 59).

He then contacted, in turn,

several attorneys in Utah County.

Each took some time to

review the file but then advised Mr. Chipman that they could
not help him because of their relationship with his former
attorney (R.221, 5511 & 12). He then contacted some attorneys
in Salt Lake County who also took some time to review the file
and then advised him that they could not help him because of
their relationship with Richins1
another

attorney

who

referred

attorney.

him

to

He contacted

Chipmanfs

attorney who agreed to discuss the matter with him.

present
However,

because he was in the middle of a trial, he couldn't give it
his immediate attention.

This process of having several

attorneys review the matter and finally locating an attorney

5

who would represent Chipman took several months (R.222, 551315) •
Chipmanf s new attorney first sent a letter to Richins and
his attorney. After writing two more letters and receiving no
satisfactory explanation and a refusal to pay any more money
(R.229, 552-8), Chipmanfs attorney filed alternative motions
to enforce termination of the stipulation and judgment for
default by Richins, to set aside the stipulation for lack of
agreement and completeness and for unconscionability

and

unenforceability, or to reform the stipulation to eliminate
ambiguities and unconscionability (R.214-216). These motions
were supported by affidavits (R.218-237) and a memorandum of
law with exhibits (R.241-300).

There were numerous opposing

memoranda, counter affidavits, motions to strike affidavits,
and reply memoranda filed

(R.301-446) but the essence of

Richins opposition was that Chipmanvs alternative motions were
untimely under Rule 60(b).

On June 8, 1989, the lower court

granted Richins1 Motion to Strike the motions filed by Chipman
but the order granting that motion was not filed until October
4, 1989 (R.451).

This appeal was filed on October 30, 1989.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
RULES 60(B)(5),(6) AND (7) PROVIDE THE COURT WITH
AUTHORITY TO CONSIDER MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE OR REFORM A
JUDGMENT FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME.
The judgment in this case was based on a supposed
stipulation between the parties.
6

Chipman did not consent to

it nor understand it and cannot be considered to have agreed
to it.

He was not effectively represented at the trial nor

during negotiations for the stipulation.

The stipulation is

supposedly contained in several different documents the terms
of

which

are

inconsistent,

confusing,

ambiguous

and

incomplete, showing that the minds of the parties did not meet
and that there is no understandable or enforceable agreement
between the parties.
unconscionable

that

Furthermore, the stipulation is so
no

court

would

enforce

it.

The

stipulation and the resulting judgment are, therefore, void
and within the terms of Rule 60(b)(5).
Because the stipulation reaches nine years into the
future and the inequity of it came to light

after the

judgment, it is no longer equitable that the judgment have
prospective application.

Rule 60(b)(6), therefore, also

applies. The ineffective representation of counsel, as can be
seen

from

a review

of the trial

transcript

or

of the

affidavits regarding his conduct, but most convincingly from
a review of the stipulation itself, which no attorney would
have allowed his client to enter, also brings this case within
Rule 60(b)(7) as any other reason justifying relief.
Chipman acted reasonably in attempting to get legal
assistance to resolve its problems and acted quickly when the
full implications of the stipulation were discovered.

The

motions to set aside or reform the stipulation and judgment

7

were filed within a reasonable time and were, therefore,
timely under Rules 60(b)(5),(6) and (7).

II. RULE 60(A) FURTHER PROVIDES THE COURT WITH AUTHORITY TO
CORRECT THE OVERSIGHTS AND OMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES AND THE
COURT AT ANY TIME.
The judgment in this case does not reflect what the court
or the parties understood or intended.

This conclusion is

reflected in the comments the court made as it discussed the
apparent inequities of the judgment.

Rule 60(a) allows the

court to correct more than clerical errors.

It grants

authority to alter or set aside any judgment which does not
reflect what was intended by the court and the parties. There
is no time limit placed on motions of this kind and such
matters can be corrected on the court's own motion when they
are brought to the court's attention.

III. THE COURT HAS INHERENT POWER, OUTSIDE THE RULES, TO SET
ASIDE OR REFORM A JUDGMENT IN ORDER TO ADMINISTER JUSTICE.
The decided cases hold that the court has inherent power
to set aside or reform formal orders in order to administer
justice.

When inequity in court orders is demonstrated, the

courts are not required to sit back and allow their orders to
work injustice.

They have the power to alter or set aside

those orders whenever that injustice becomes apparent to them.
This power exists separate and apart from the rules of
procedure, but is also implicit in those rules which are to be
liberally construed to secure the just determination of every
8

action. That inherent power is available to grant the relief
requested in this case.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
CHIPMAN'S MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE OR TO REFORM THE
STIPULATION AND JUDGMENT WERE PROPERLY FILED UNDER
RULES 60(b)(5),(6) OR (7) AND WERE FILED WITHIN A
REASONABLE TIME.
The pertinent portions of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P., provide
as follows:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order,, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; ... (5) the judgment is void;
(6) the judgment had been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (7) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken."
Richins has contended that the basis of Chipman's motions
was a mistake in entering the stipulation and that, because
the motions were not filed within three months of the entry of
judgment, they were untimely.

That contention misses the

entire point of Chipman's motions, chipman did not enter into
any agreement at all.

Mr. Chipman did not understand what

Richins was trying to impose upon him and his corporation. He
did not agree to anything. His lack of understanding was not

9

a mistake but it shows that no agreement was entered into and
further supports the claim that Chipman was not effectively
represented.

The

resulting

ambiguity,

inconsistency,

incompleteness, and unconscionability of the stipulation show
that the minds of the parties had not met and that the
stipulation is unenforceable and void.

A motion based on

these grounds falls within Rules 60(b)(5), (6) or (7) and may,
therefore, be filed within a reasonable time and is not
required to be filed within three months. In order to provide
the full background to clearly establish these grounds, a
separate discussion of each element will be presented.
A. CHIPMAN DID NOT CONSENT TO THE STIPULATION AND
DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE STIPULATION AND CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED TO HAVE AGREED TO IT.
A reading of the transcript of the Stipulation in court
on December 21, 1987 (R.504-516) shows that Mr. Chipman did
not consent to the Stipulation as it had been presented.
After the Stipulation had been presented, Mr. Chipman was
asked if he had listened to the Stipulation, his response was,
"What Stipulation?"

When told it was the Stipulation Mr.

Brown just stated into the record he said, "Well, I don't
understand it."

When nudged by his attorney and further

prodded by the statement, "Well, have you been in here and you
understand it?" he answered, "I have been in here a long time
and I don't quite understand it but I guess it is all right."
(R.512)

During the presentation of the Stipulation by Mr.

Brown, Mr. Chipman asked if he could say something, indicating
10

his lack of approval or of understanding of what had been
presented, but was not allowed to speak (R.509).
This limited conversation hardly indicates an approval of
the terms of the Stipulation but it clearly shows that Mr.
Chipman did not understand it.

Without an understanding of

it, he could not effectively have approved it.

Further,

nowhere in the Stipulation transcript is there a statement by
Mr. Chipman's attorney that he approved or agreed to the
Stipulation and he was not asked for his approval as were all
of the other parties and attorneys. There simply is no clear
statement by Mr. Chipman or his attorney that the Stipulation
was approved.
Mr. Chipman's lack of understanding of the terms of the
Stipulation is not surprising in light of the many ambiguities
and inconsistencies which are discussed in Point IC below, nor
is it surprising that he would not agree to the Stipulation in
light of the one-sided and unfair nature of it as discussed in
Point ID below.
The courts of this state have held that "parties are
bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the
court, which has the power to set aside a stipulation entered
into inadvertently or for justifiable cause." First of Denver
Mortgage Investors v. Zundel. 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) at 527.*
A stipulation in court to settle a case is just like any other
contract in that it requires a meeting of the minds of the
parties before it is effective.
11

"[T]he same rules apply to

binding parties to such an agreement [a stipulation in court]
as apply to any other agreement."
472 (Utah 1975) at 476.

Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d

That case is very similar to this

case in that an oral stipulation was read into the record and
the plaintiff stated that he did not understand it but relied
on his attorney. The court there stated that "the issue as to
whether plaintiff agreed to and should be bound by the
stipulation was one of fact for the trial court to determine."
In Klein the trial court did not set aside the stipulation in
part at least because the stipulation was found to be more
favorable to the plaintiff than the prior order by some
$200,000.00.
set it aside.

There was, therefore, no justifiable cause to
Here, as will be seen from Point ID below,

there is justifiable cause to set aside the Stipulation
because Chipman is worse off by somewhere between $89,000.00
and $150,000.00 than if the trial had been completed and all
issues found against Chipman.
Chipman should not be bound by a stipulation to which it
has not consented and which it did not understand.

B. CHIPMAN WAS NOT EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL AND IS ENTITLED TO BE RELIEVED FROM THE
STIPULATIONS AND JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST IT WHILE
IT WAS WITHOUT EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION.
An essential factor in the adversarial system of justice
in this country is that each party to a dispute be effectively
represented by a competent advocate who will present his
client's side of the case clearly and aggressively and protect
12

his client's interest both in court and in negotiations with
opposing parties.

When a party is prevented from having his

position heard and considered or is saddled with an unfair and
harsh stipulation or judgment as a result of ineffective
representation by his attorney, the rules of equity allow that
party to be relieved therefrom.
plaintiff's

complaint

was

In a case in which the

dismissed

for

failure

of

the

plaintiff's attorney to respond to discovery requests and in
which the plaintiff himself had no knowledge thereof until
several months later when he employed other counsel, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the "provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) are
sufficiently broad to permit the court to set aside its former
order . . . ." Stewart v. Sullivan. 29 U.2d 156, 506 P. 2d 74
(1973) .
The Supreme Court had earlier held that a trial court
"may exercise wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors
of fairness" in relieving a party from a harsh judgment.
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953).
That language was repeated in Ney v. Harrison, 5 U. 2d 217, 299
P. 2d 1114 (1956) , in holding that Rule 60(b) (7) , Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, was intended to govern cases where equity and
fairness dictate that a party should be relieved from the
effects of a judgment entered against an unrepresented party
who mistakenly believed she was protected.

Her motion for

relief was filed 11 months after the judgment.
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In this case, Chipman has presented facts which, if true,
would clearly indicate it was not effectively represented by
counsel.

If, in fact, counsel for Chipman was under the

influence of alcohol during the trial and negotiations for a
stipulation, Chipman was not effectively represented. All of
the facts reicited in paragraph 8 of the Chipman Affidavit
(R.220-221)

and paragraph

5 of the Osguthorpe Affidavit

(R.226-227) are consistent with that conclusion and would
suggest that Chipman ought to be relieved from the Stipulation
and resulting judgment. However, this brief will not dwell on
those facts, which speak for themselves, but rather on the
terms of the Stipulation and Judgment, which are so ambiguous,
inconsistent, incomplete, unfair and unconscionable that no
attorney acting in the interests of Chipman could or would
have approved them.

These matters are discussed in detail in

Points IC and ID below, which are asserted as separate grounds
for setting aside the Stipulation and Judgment.

They are

incorporated herein by reference as clear and convincing
evidence

of

the

fact

that

Chipman

was

not

effectively

represented and should be granted relief from the Stipulation
and

Judgment

entered

as

a

result

of

that

ineffective

representation, under Rule 60(b)(7).

C. THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION, STIPULATION FOR
SETTLEMENT AND JUDGMENT, AND JUDGMENT ARE SO
AMBIGUOUS, INCONSISTENT, UNCLEAR, CONFUSING, AND
INCOMPLETE AS TO SHOW THAT THE MINDS OF THE PARTIES
HAVE NOT MET WITH RESPECT TO THE TERMS THEREOF AND
AS TO BE UNENFORCEABLE AND VOID.
14

It has already been pointed out above that a stipulation
^n

court

j^s j u s t li^e a n y other agreement and if "there is any

justification in law or equity for avoiding or repudiating a
stipulation, .
it . c .

[a party] is entitled to be relieved from

" Klein v. Klein, £*:

. ••>

1975) at 476,

An agreement which is so ambiguous, inconsistent, unclear and
confusing as to demonstrate that the minds of the parties have
not met i s no agreement at al ] and cannot be enforced by the
parties. Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P. 2d
1317

(Utah

1976), wherein

the

following

is quoted

from

Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U.2d 61, 362 P.2d 427 (1961):
"A condition precedent to the enforcement of any
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of
the parties, which must be spelled out, either
expressly
or
impliedly,
with
sufficient
definiteness to be enforced."
With respect to the enforceability of the contract, it is
stated i JI 4 9 Mi • II ur, Specific Performance, §22, at page 35:
"The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness,
and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture
or to be supplied by the court.
It must be
sufficiently certain and definite in its terms to
leave no reasonable doubt as to what the parties
intended, and no reasonable doubt of the specific
thing equity is called upon to have performed, and
it must be sufficiently certain as to its terms so
that the court may enforce it as actually made by
the parties."
With these principles in mind, let's examine some of the
terms of the stipulation which it is claimed the parties
agreed to in this case.

The "stipulation" is contained in

several documents: the stipulation

in court

(Stipulation

Transcript) (R.514-16), the Stipulation for Settlement (R.20215

206 and 278-282), the Sale and Lease Agreement (R.283-294)
which was unsigned and not attached to the Stipulation for
Settlement, and a revised Sale and Lease Agreement (R.318-329)
which neither Chipman nor his attorney have ever seen and
which was not attached to the Stipulation for Settlement and
did not even appear in the file until after Chipmanfs motions
were filed,
1.

There

is

a

reduction

in

the

semi-annual

lease

payments from $24,000•00 to $21,500.00 (R.507, line 19) for
the last nine (9) years of the lease, or a total reduction of
$45,000.00.

Yet, later the

$40,000.00 (R.509,line 2).

reduction

is stated

to be

In addition, the Stipulation for

Settlement and Judgment filed January 6, 1988 provides in
f8.c. (R.281) that, if the first option is not exercised,
additional offsets of $20,000.00 would be taken against the
April 1990 and December 1990 payments.

It is not clear that

this is one offset of $20,000.00 or two offsets totalling
$4 0,000.00. In either event, when added to the four (4) years
of $2,500.00 semi-annual offsets totalling $20,000.00 to that
point in time*, the total offset would be either $40,000.00 or
$60,000.00, both of which are inconsistent with the $45,000.00
offset stated at page 4 (R.507), line 19 of the Stipulation
Transcript.

A similar ambiguity appears in f8.d. of the

Stipulation for Settlement and Judgment (R.281) which provides
that, if the second option is not exercised, additional
offsets of $10,000.00 would be taken from the April 1993 and
16

December 1992 payments.
is

one

offset

$20,000.00.

In;r

ui

Again, it is not clear whether this

$10,000.00

or

two

offsets

totalling

in either event, when added to the seven (7)

years of $2,50C» \ semi-annual offsets totalling $35,000.00 to
that

poi nt

.

- *, t h*-1 f ota I • of f set

woi i] d

be

either

$45,000,00 or $55,000.00, both of which are inconsistent with
the terms of f'8.c

and one of which is inconsistent with the

$45,000 00 offset stated at page 4 (R. 507), line 19 of the
Stipulation Transcript.
2

Further ambiguities appear in 558.c. and 8.d. (R.281)

of the Stipulation for Settlement wherein it is stated that
offsets will be taken from the 1990 installments if the option
to renew' :ii s not exercised but the opti on

Itself does not

expire until November 1, 1991 (Sale and Lease Agreement, 52.4,
R.286) and wherein it is stated that offsets will be taken
from the April 1993 and December 1992 installments if the
second option to renew is not exercised but the second option
does not expire until November 1, 1994 (R.2 87, 52.5) . How can
offsets be taken against installments due before the option
exercise dates when those offsets are determined by whether or
i io1. the jpt ions .-.ire exercised?
3.

There is a minor ambiguity on page 5 (R.508) , line 8,

of the Stipulation Transcript which provides for a reduction
in payments to Chipman of $11,520.00 per year or $5,765.00 per
semi-annual payment.
$5,760.00,

The semi-annual reduction should

However, this minor ambiguity i * ^r^:a^e^
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be

*/hen it

is stated on page 5 (R.508), line 6, of the Stipulation
Transcript that this reduction "would be done on a semi-annual
payment basis," that is, $5,760.00 from each semi-annual
installment,

yet

page

7

(R.570),

lines

13-16,

of

the

Stipulation Transcript, which does not appear to be part of
the Stipulation but just a statement "for the record" (R.570,
line 7 ) , states that $11,520.00 will be deducted from the
April 1988 payment.

These reductions should be taken either

annually or semi-annually but not both and not at the Richins1
option.

These provisions are clearly ambiguous.

4.

Further

problems

arise with

this

"Pine Hollow"

reduction of $11,520.00 per year or $5,760.00 per semi-annual
installment since the Stipulation does not state how many
years or installments will be affected by this reduction. The
price to be paid for the Pine Hollow permit was $3 0,000.00
(Sale

and

Lease

Agreement,

R.284,

^1.5:a).

If

these

reductions are taken for only three (3) years, Richins will
have received credit for more than he agreed to pay for that
permit.

And, if these reductions continue for the full term

of the Lease, the credits to Richins will be both ludicrous
and unconscionable in amount.

The ambiguous nature of this

provision clearly shows that the minds of the parties did not
meet.

This becomes more obvious when it is realized that the

Pine Hollow permit was part of the sale portion of the Sale
and Lease Agreement (R.284, 51.4) and had nothing to do with
the Lease portion of that agreement.
18

Why should the lease

payments on other ground be reduced because of the loss of the
Pine Hollow permit?

A reduction in the purchase price for

this permit might make sense or a reduction related to the
loss of the use
understandable,

of

tins permit

for one year might be

!

Hut

i possible reduction every year for the

full term of the J ease makes no sense at all and only shows
how obvious it is that the parties did not and could not have
agreed t :> tl lis provisi 01 i
5.
funds

The stipulation to pay $15,700.00 to Chipman from the
deposited

Ii 1 coi lr t

(R. 510,

l me

3,

Stipulation

Transcript) reflects reductions in the $24,000.00 installment
due under the Sale and Lease Agreement on December 15, 1987
(R 285, 5[2.3:b.2.) of $8,300.00 will ch is apparently made up of
$4,000.00

paid

to

the

Porters,

$2,500.00

as

the

first

installment of the offset damages, and $1,800.00 to be paid by
Richins directly to Deer Creek Land & Livestock (R,506, line
22 and R.507, line 3, Stipulation Transcript).

Since no

payment was due Deer Creek Land & Livestock until May of 1988,
this reduction in December of 1987 is unexplained and creates
another ambiguity or confusion.
6.

The

-: -pulation

Transcript

at

R.508,

line

11,

provides for payments without interest to the Porters until
April,

1990 whereas

the

Stipulation

for

Settlement

and

Judgment

(R,2 79) provides in <n,h, for interest and for

payments

only

to

December

15,

irreconci1ab] e ambIgu111es.
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1989.

Again,

we

have

7.

The Stipulation for Settlement further provides in

paragraph 4 (R.279) that Chipman is to have until December 15,
1989 to transfer the Pine Hollow permit whereas there is no
such limitation in the Stipulation Transcript.

It should be

kept in mind that Mr. Chipman did not see the Stipulation for
Settlement and had no opportunity to agree to the terms
thereof. Therefore, besides not having consented to the court
stipulation itself, Mr. Chipman had no opportunity to agree to
any changes thereto or clarifications thereof that may be
contained in the Stipulation for Settlement or in any other
document.
8.

Paragraph 5 of the Stipulation for Settlement further

provides for an $11,520.00 annual reduction in payments for
the Pine Hollow permit "under the provisions of paragraph 2.8
of the Agreement", apparently referring to the Sale and Lease
Agreement.

However, paragraph 2.8 of the Sale and Lease

Agreement (R.288) only applies to loss of leased ground and
has nothing to do with the permits which were sold. This only
reinforces the argument that the cost of a lost permit should
not be offset against lease payments since there
relationship

between

the

two.

Again,

is no

ambiguity,

inconsistency, and confusion are the governing principles of
the stipulations.
9.

Paragraph 5 of the Stipulation for Settlement (R.

279-280) also provides for a partial reduction for loss of the
Pine Hollow permit "at the rate of $9.60 per head that the
20

quota is reduced."
stipulation.

This also is not part of the in-court

There is no explanation as to the source of this

figure but, after review of the documents;

appears that

this figure is the amount obtained by dividing $48,000.00 (the
. in in nidi 1 lease payment riup under the sale and Lease Agreement,
12.3.b-e) by 5,000 (the number of sheep that Richins claimed
were to be grazed on all of the Chipman property) . The annual
reduction of $13 , 52 0 . 00 appear s to be the ainoi int. obtai ned by
multiplying this $9.60 per head by 1200 (the number of sheep
allowed to be grazed on the Pine Hollow permit)(R.295).

Why

the loss of one permit which was used

(3)

for only

three

months of the year (see Term Grazing Permit, R.295) should
reduce the lease payment as if the loss of use was year round
is incomprehensible.

At most the reduction should have been

only one-fourth of $11,520.00 or $2,880.00 per year.

Again,

we have reinforcemei it of tl: le argumei it that the cost of a lost
permit should not be offset against lease payments on other
.ground

especially when the lost permit was usable only three

(3) months a year and the lease payments cover the ground that
was usable the other nine (9) months of the year.

There is no

relationship and the ambiguity caused by relating the two in
the stipulations further emphasizes the fact that the minds of
the parties have not met.
10. There are fi irther indications that the minds of the
parties did not meet arising from the failure of the Richins
to pay to Chipman even the semi-annual installments set forth
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in the Stipulation, claiming further reductions not appearing
anywhere in the stipulations.

But the foregoing recitation

should be sufficient to demonstrate (1) that the stipulations
are so ambiguous, inconsistent, and confusing as not to be
capable of being understood by anybody; (2) that the terms of
the stipulations are not sufficiently definite to be enforced;
(3) that Mr. Chipman was not effectively represented in the
negotiations for, and agreement to, such stipulations; and (4)
that

Mr.

Chipman

could

not

consented to, the stipulations.
certainty

required

of

therefore, be enforced.

have

understood,

let

alone

These stipulations lack the

enforceable

contracts

and

cannot,

Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 18 U.2d 3 68,

423 P.2d 491 (1967) at 493.
11. The most serious defect in the stipulations and the
judgment is the fact that the property which is supposedly
subject to the stipulations and the judgment

is nowhere

described or identified sufficiently to satisfy the statute of
frauds.

This same defect was also present in the original

agreement which Richins alleged to have made with Chipman,
demonstrating that Richins were not entitled to the relief
sought in this suit.
into the

stipulations

unenforceable.

However, that defect was carried over
and

judgment

and makes them

also

The applicable statute is §25-5-3, U.C.Ac,

which provides as follows:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period
than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
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writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease
or sale is to be made or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized in writing.
In holding a contract void which did not include the
legal descriptions of the property to be sold, the Utah Court
of Appeals, in Vasels v. LoGuidice, 7 40 P 2d 1375 (I Jtah Ct.
App. 1987), quoted the above statute and then stated:
"It is fundamental that the memorandum which is
relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds must
contain all the essential terms and provisions of
the contract." Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co.,
121 Utah 412, 416, 242 P.2d 578, 580 (1952). The
identity
of
the property
to
be
sold
is
unquestionably an essential term of an enforceable
land sales contract. See e.g., Barnard v. Barnard,
700 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1985); Davison v. Robbins, 30
Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973); Pitcher v.
Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967).

The results in these cases flow naturally from the
basic principle that the mutual assent of the
parties is essential to create a binding contract.
Bunnell v. Bills. 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 597
(1962); E.B. Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 103 Utah 554, 137
P.2d 342 (1943). . . . Here, as in Davison, the
parties1 written agreement shows undisputably that
the requisite meeting of the minds on this
essential term did not take place.
Thus, no
contract was formed, and the buyers were entitled
to the return of their payment. The trial judgment
correctly ruled that the document was not a
contract that could be enforced under our statute.
Since the :;l i puJ at n »ns and judgment .ire mot only a sale
but a lease of real property for more than one year, they are
clearly subject to the statute of frauds. Mr. Chipman was not
aware that his properties were being leased for ten years
(R.220, 57(f)).
other party

Furthermore, it is irrelevant what he or any

thought.

I f the property
23

invo 1 ved. I s not

sufficiently described, the stipulations and judgment, like
any contract, are void and unenforceable,

D. THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION, STIPULATION FOR
SETTLEMENT AND JUDGMENT, AND JUDGMENT ARE SO UNFAIR
AND INEQUITABLE AS TO BE UNCONSCIONABLE AND,
THEREFORE, UNENFORCEABLE.
To understand how unfair the stipulations are, it must be
remembered that Richins was claiming a total of $130,643.00
damages from Chipman (see Trial Exhibit 18 which is at R.296).
At the time of the Stipulation in court, Richins had put on
his entire case and had rested.

A review of the trial

transcript shows that Richins had not proved the existence of
a contract with Chipman as claimed, had failed to prove he had
actually suffered the damages claimed, and had failed to prove
that such damages had been caused by any breach of a contract
by Chipman. All of the claimed damages could be attributed to
Richins1 own management methods, the weather, or other causes.
Chipman had not yet been allowed to put on its evidence which
might have required the court to dismiss Richins1 claims
entirely but surely would have reduced those claims to some
degree. Under such circumstances, a compromise and settlement
would normally result in an agreement to pay Richins some
fraction of the $130,643.00 he was claiming.

Yet, as near as

can be determined from the stipulations and from the Richins'
interpretation of them, as expressed by actual payments made
(or rather not made), Chipman has lost a total of between
$219,680.00 and $281,330.00.

What kind of a compromise and
24

settlement

is that?

accepted Richins 1

Assuming

claims

in

the worst, that

full

dinini rejected

the

a LI

court

evidence

offered by Chipman, Chipman would have lost only $130,643.00.
The

"compromise"

$281 , 330 00 !

The

results

:i n

a

1 oss

of"

$219,680.00

to

i nequ i t. y in tha t si >eaks for i tself

These "compromise" losses to Chipman are calculated

as

follows:

The stipulations
Chipman as follows:

reduce

the amounts

November 30, 1986
Lease Payment

to be

received

$ 21,000.00

18 payment reductions or
$2,500.00 each
Pine Hollow Reductions of
$11,520.00 x 9 years

45,000.00

103,680.00

Elimina11oi I c >f ] 1 -15-8 9
Payment

3 0,000.00

Payments to Porters

20,000.00

Sub-Total:

$219,680.00

In
addition,
Richins
is
claiming additional reductions of
$2,500.00
per
semi-annual
installment not apparent in the
stipulations but deducted
from
the 1988 installments which were
due but not paid (see R.297) x
18 =

45,000.00

Richins is further claiming
the right to deduct for other
items without any relationship
to diminished carrying capacity
or time of use (see R.299, "Lost
Church G r o u n d — $ 7 5 0 . 0 0 " ) x

9 years

6,750.00
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by

Additional losses may result
from matters not covered by the
stipulations because Richins is
paying increased payments to Deer
Creek Land and Livestock and
other parties to whom lease
payments are due and deducting
the
amounts
thereof
from
installments due Chipman without
increasing the installments due
Chipman by the increases in those
underlying payments:
Deer Creek Payment of
$3,600.00 less $3,000.00
included in Chipman Lease
for Deer Creek = $600.00 x 9 =

5,400.00

Waldo Corporation Payment of
$5,000.00 (R.297 & 299) less
$4,500.00 included in Chipman
Lease for Waldo = $500.00 x 9 =

4,500.00

Sub-Total:

$ 61,650.00

TOTAL REDUCTIONS:

$281,330.00

Such a "settlement" makes these stipulations subject to
the principles stated in Resource Management Co. v. Weston
Ranch & Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985):
"Courts will not be parties to enforcing flagrantly
unjust agreements." (at page 1040)
An unconscionable contract is one which "no decent,
fair-minded person would view the ensuing result
without being possessed of a profound sense of
injustice." (at page 1041)
"Historically,
a
bargain
was
said
to
be
unconscionable if it was *such as no man in his
senses and not under delusion would make on the one
hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on
the other.1" (at page 1040)
"Substantive unconscionability is indicated by
*contract terms so one-sided as to oppress or
unfairly surprise an innocent party.1"
(at page
1040)
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Factors

which

are

considered

in

determining

unconscionability include excessive price, phrasing clauses in
language

that

is

imbalance

in

barge

• •• tf opportunity toi meaninqfu1 neqotiat HIH,

the

incomprehensible
obligations

and

to

a

layman,

overall

rights

imposed

by

the
ind

whether the aggrieved party was compelled to accept the terms.
See Resource Management Co. above, at 1042, and Bekins Bar V
Ranch V. Huth, 6<:>4 I1", 2d 4>:>5 (Utah 1983) at 462.

If ever there were a case where "no decent, fair-minded
person would view the ensuing result without being possessed
of a profound sense of injustice11, this is it.
maximum

possible

"compromise11

1 oss

loss
ut

of

$130,643.00

;i- !<>,680. on

to

be

How could a

turned

$281,330.00

into

a

without

invoking a profound sense of injustice in decent, fair-minded
persons?

Surely "i10 man in his senses and not under delusion

would ma ke [and] . . . no honest ai id fa i r man would accept11
such a bargain.
from

Chipman,

language

Quite clearly, the excessive price extracted
the

ambiguities

incomprehensible

and

confusion

included

in

both to layman and lawyers, Mr.

Chipman's lack of opportunity for a meaningful negotiation,
iind his I'iav i nq b<-»r»n pressured i nto a settl emei it have resulted
in stipulations with "terms so one-sided as to oppress or
unfairly surprise an innocent party."

This court should not

lif a pai t y to th<* eniorcement of such a "flagrantly unjust11
agreement and should set aside the stipulations and judgment.
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E. IN THE EVENT THE COURT DOES NOT SET ASIDE THE
STIPULATIONS AND JUDGMENT FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH
ABOVE, IT SHOULD REFORM THE STIPULATIONS AND
JUDGMENT TO CONFORM TO THE INTENTIONS OF THE
PARTIES AND TO MAKE THE STIPULATIONS AND JUDGMENT
FAIR AND EQUITABLE.
The

above

cases

establish

that

"if

a

contract

is

unconscionable, in whole or in part, the court may, on
equitable

grounds, refuse

to

enforce

the

unconscionable

provisions, or it may construe the contract to avoid an
unconscionable result."

Resource Management Co., above, at

1040; Bekins Bar V Ranch, above, cit 459; Biesincrer v. Behunin,
584 P. 2d 801 (Utah 1978) at 803. There is further substantial
authority for the court to reform a stipulation, if the court
determines that the minds of the parties had met, but the
stipulation and/or judgment fail to conform to the intentions
of the parties or that one party was mistaken as to the actual
content of the stipulation or judgment and the other party
knew of the mistake and remained silent or is guilty of fraud
or

other

inequitable

conduct.

Mabey

v.

Kay

Peterson

Construction Co., Inc., 682 P. 2d 287 (Utah 1984) at 290;
Thompson v. Smith, 620 P. 2d 520 (Utah 1980) at 523; Kesler v.
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975); Jensen v. Manila Corp. of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 565 P.2d 63
(Utah 1977); Intermountain Farmers Association v. Peart, 3 0
U.2d

201,

515

P.2d

614

(1973).

Judgments

based

on

stipulations are subject to the same rules of construction or
as to enforcement as all written contracts. Lucky Seven Rodeo
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750 (Utah 1988).
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The unconscionable results outlined in Point ID above
req[u:i re

t::l: le

stipulation

coi irt

and

ei tl iei:

judgment

tc

or

se t

to

01 : resci ncl

the

enforce

to

asj :ie

refuse

or

construe them so as to avoid the obvious unconscionabilityo
'Those

same

ambiguities
understanding

uni'nnsci,vuMo
outlined
^±.

resu] t i:-,,

Point

consent

and

IC

toqether

above

and

ineffective

the

with
lack

the
of

representation

referred to in Points IA and IB above, make it clear that
Chipman

did

not

and

could

not

have

intended

what

the

stipulations and judgment apparent] y provide ai id w ha 1: R ich i ns
claim they provide as shown by his refusal to pay any 1988
installments (See R-297 & 2 9 9 ) .

It does not matter whether

R ich ins takes the positi on that he di .dn ' t iinderstarid, too, and
did not know these unconscionable results would follow or that
lie

was

aware of Chipman's lack of understanding and remained

silent only

ater take advantage of him by refusing to pay

installments that Chipman thought were due.

In either case,

re forma t ion is app r op r i at e i f the s t i pi i ] a t :i o n s and j udgment
are not set aside or rescinded.
It must be remembered that Chipman's intent from the
first was t o s e 111 ] t o R i c h i n s o n e p e r m I t a n d 1 e a s e i t s other
land for one year at a time.

Mr. Chipman agreed to nothing

more than that and his actions were entirely consistent with
that intent.
and

judgment

He was shocked to find out that the stipulations
bound him

L

an agreement

Chipman ] and for ten (] A > i years.
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that

tied up

the

Even at that, he she i i,l d have

been able to expect payment in full of the $48,000.00 annual
lease payments for those ten (10) years. Yet, even though the
time has passed for the payment of eight (8) semi-annual
installments of $24,000.00 each, Chipman has only received one
and

part

of

another.

The prospects

are that, as the

stipulation and judgment are interpreted by Richins, Chipman
will receive very little, if any, of the future installments.
Again,

a

total

loss

to

Chipman

of

$219,680.00

to

$281,330.00, when its maximum loss if it would have allowed
Richins to take a default judgment would only have been
$130,643.00,

is unconscionable

and

could

not

have

been

understood or intended by Chipman or the court. Reformation,
if not rescission or setting aside the stipulations and
judgment,

is

clearly

the

duty

of

the

court.

In

the

alternative, of course, the stipulations should be terminated
for nonpayment and Richins ordered to convey to Chipman all
leases and permits previously assigned or issued to Richins.

P. RULES 60(b)(5), (6) and (7) ARE APPLICABLE TO
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
With this background demonstrating that the minds of the
parties did

not meet, that Chipman was not

effectively

represented, that the stipulation is void and unenforceable
for ambiguity, inconsistency, and incompleteness, and also for
unconscionability, the question of the application of Rules
60(b)(5), (6) or (7) can be more effectively addressed.
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Since judgments based on stipulations are subject to the
same rules of construction or as to enforcement as all written
contracts, Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp, v. Clark, supra, all of the
elements discussed above, that is, lack of a meeting of the
minds,

ambiguity,

inconsistency,

incompleteness

and

unconscionability, that render a contract void, also render
the judgment based on the stipulation in this case void.
Therefore, Rule 60(b)(5), allowing a void judgment to be set
aside, applies in this case.

Chipman has simply asked the

court to examine the various documents which purport to
contain the stipulation of the parties and determine, if
possible, the intentions of the parties and if they have
agreed on the essential elements of a fair and enforceable
contract.
elements

Those documents do not contain those essential
and,

therefore, the

judgment

and

the

supposed

stipulation on which it is based are void. The document which
Richins1 claims constitutes the agreement between the parties
is not signed by any of the parties (though signature lines
are provided) (R.318-329) and is not even attached to the
written Stipulation for Settlement nor to the Judgment (though
supposedly referred to in both).

That document was not even

in the file in this case until Richins' attorney attached it
to his response to Chipman's motions.

Until then it had not

been seen by Chipman nor his attorney nor by the court.
Furthermore, none of the documents, including that one,
describe the real property that is supposed to be governed by
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them.

That is an essential of any contract for the sale or

lease of real property. Add to that the unconscionability of
the stipulation and judgment and the unenforceability of the
purported stipulation becomes obvious many times over.

The

purported stipulation and the judgment based thereon are void
and Rule 60(b)(5) clearly applies.
The stipulation and judgment in this case provide for
payments to be made for nine years into the future.
prospective

application

This

of the judgment also means that

Chipman's motions qualify under Rule 60(b)(6) as a motion to
relieve a party from a judgment because "it is no longer
equitable

that

application."
Richins

to

the

judgment

should

have

prospective

The payments to be made in the future from

Chipman

are

calculated

based

on

semi-annual

reductions for payments for alleged but unproved damages due
from Chipman to Richins. These reductions claimed by Richins,
as has been demonstrated

above, were not understood

or

intended

the

an

by

unconscionable

Chipman

or

arrangement.

court
These

and

result

inequities

in

were

not

discovered by Chipman until after the judgment was entered.
It is, therefore, "no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application" and it is appropriate to
set aside or modify the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) to
prevent injustice.

That has been the holding of several

federal cases interpreting the comparable provision of the
federal rule. Bros. Inc. v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co.. 320 F.2d 594
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(CA5, 1963); Tsakonites v. Transpacific Carrier Corp., 322 F.
Supp. 722 (DCNY 1970).
Reference has already been made to Stewart v. Sullivan
and Ney v. Harrison, supra, which held motions to set aside
inequitable

judgments

resulting

from

representation to come within Rule 60(b)(7).

ineffective
That principle

certainly applies here. The obvious inequity in this case, if
no other ground can be found, is clearly "any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
60(b)(7).

Rule

In fact, it would be difficult to find a case with

more reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.

The wide discretion implicit in Rule 60(b)(7) was

designed for such cases and if not applied to them would be
rendered meaningless.

Of the federal counterpart to this

rule, it has been said that it "vests power in courts adequate
to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is
appropriate to accomplish justice."
States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949).

Klapprott v. United
This rule is available

where unusual circumstances have led to a tainted judgment.
Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 576-578
fn. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

It is submitted that this case

qualifies for relief under Rule 60(b)(7).
Motions under Rules

60(b)(5),

(6) and

(7) are not

required to be brought within three months but only within a
reasonable time.

What is a reasonable time depends on the

circumstances. In this case, Chipman was delayed first by the
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lack of response or action by its original attorney and then
for many months by the time required for several attorneys, in
turn, to review the file and reject the case and then for its
present attorney to read the file, the various transcripts and
depositions, numerous exhibits and documents involved and to
study

the

various

documents

purporting

to

contain

the

stipulation of the parties to determine their effect on
Chipman.

When that effect was determined, letters were

written to Richins and his attorney which eventually led to a
meeting in which Richins refused to pay any more money and
confirmed his unconscionable understanding of the stipulation
(R.228-237).

When it thus became obvious that Richins1

interpretation of the stipulation would cost Chipman from
$219,680.00 to $281,330.00 when his total "compromise" loss
should have been less than $130,643.00, he acted immediately.
The motions were filed within eleven days of the meeting with
Richins which confirmed the status of the stipulation.

He

acted within a reasonable time even though the motions were
filed within fourteen months of the judgment.

The motion in

Stewart v. Sullivan, supra, was filed ten months after the
judgment and in Ney v. Harrison, supra, eleven months after
the judgment. In both cases, the motion was held to be timely
and was granted.

Likewise, Chipman has acted within a

reasonable time under the circumstances and is entitled to
relief under Rules 60(b)(5), (6) or (7).

34

POINT II
RELIEF FROM A JUDGMENT IS ALSO AVAILABLE UNDER RULE
60(a) "AT ANY TIME."
Rule 60(a), U.R.C.P., provides as follows:
"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court
at any time of its own initiative or on the motion
of any party and after such notice, if any, as the
court orders . . . ."
It is usually assumed that Rule 60(a) applies only to
clerical errors but a careful reading of the rule demonstrates
that it also applies to errors which are not clerical but
which arise "from oversight or omission."

Such errors may be

corrected "at any time."
This and other grounds have been the basis for vacating
an order which does not accurately reflect the result of the
court's judgment.

In Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 U.2d 196,

299 P.2d 827 (1956), the court stated:
"It is well established that the court may vacate,
set aside, or modify its orders or judgments
entered by mistake or inadvertence which do not
accurately reflect the result of its judgment. It
is plainly apparent that the trial court thought he
was signing an order that Equity Oil release the
one half of the proceeds of oil production to Stock
and Juhan which it had been adjudicated previously
that they were entitled to (the Phebus half), and
that the judge did not know that they had been
currently receiving such funds, nor that the effect
of the order he signed would have been to release
to them one half of the other half (the Stock half)
of the funds to which it had been adjudicated that
they were not entitled. This act did not reflect
his judgment, and, therefore, does not represent an
error in judgment on his part. It was a mistake of
a perfunctory or clerical nature apparently
resulting from an erroneous assumption that the
order as prepared by counsel correctly reflected
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the judgment of this and the lower court. It is
the type of error the court could and properly did,
correct upon its own motion. The authority of the
court to cause its proceedings and its judgments
and orders to be correctly set forth in its records
is necessarily inherent in its powers for the
purpose of administering justice.
In our case, it was not the court's intention to sign a
judgment

which

would

result

in

a

loss

to

Chipman

of

$280,000.00 when the maximum judgment plaintiffs were entitled
to was $130,000.00.
This is apparent from the lower court's comments at the
hearing on May 5, 1989.

After learning of the discrepancy

between the losses to Chipman under the stipulation and the
damages claimed by Richins, the court stated "this concerns
me" (R.616, line 16).

When the court learned that the losses

for the Pin€» Hollow permit were nine times the amount shown
for this loss on Exhibit 18 (R.296), the court stated "that
doesn't seem appropriate to me" (R.620, line 15).

Then, in a

conversation with Richins' attorney, the court clearly stated
its disagreement with Richins' claim of damages for nine years
without mitigating damages and that such a measure of damages
was "extremely difficult" (R.622, line 9) and not "appropriate
or fair" (R.621, line 17).
The judgment, as prepared by Richins' attorney, was
signed by the court under the erroneous assumption that it
correctly reflected a stipulation which would not cause a loss
to Chipman of more than $130,000.00. This was an oversight or
omission which can be corrected by the court under Rule 60(a)
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because, as in Meagher v. Equity Oil Co,, supra, the judgment
as signed did not reflect the judgment or intent of the court.

POINT III
THE COURT HAS INHERENT POWER TO SET ASIDE OR REFORM
THE JUDGMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ADMINISTERING
JUSTICE.
The Meaaher v. Equity Oil Co, case, supra, stated that
the court has authority that "is necessarily inherent in its
powers for the purpose of administering

justice.11

This

inherent power was an alternate basis for the decision in
Dixon v, Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 1211 (1952), in which
the court held that a motion to set aside a judgment that was
not in compliance with a stipulation of the parties was proper
and timely even though it was filed more than three months
after entry of the judgment.

The court stated:

" . . . the formal order of April 3, 1950, was more
than a mere inadvertence. The record as corrected
by the inclusion therein of the minute order of
July 8, 1949, clearly indicates that the signing
and entering of such formal order was done upon the
erroneous assumption that it conformed to a
direction of the court theretofore made after a
hearing on the merits. In light of the allegations
of plaintiff's petition requesting that it be set
aside, it would work upon her a grave injustice to
permit the order to stand.
Under Rule 60(b),
U.R.C.P., a judgment or order may be set aside for
any reason other than those specified in reasons 1
to 6 *justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment1, if motion is made within a reasonable
time. In view of plaintiff's physical and mental
condition, we cannot say that application for the
relief asked was unseasonably made. Furthermore,
in the absence of a rule to that effect, the court,
perhaps, had inherent power to set the formal order
aside."
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The facts now before the court also fit squarely within
the holding of that case.

The judgment does not comply with

the stipulation which was clearly not understood nor agreed to
by Chipman.

These circumstances clearly fall within Rule

60(b)(7) as "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment" and the court further, in the
absence of such a rule, has "inherent power to set the formal
order aside."

Dixon, at 1212.

Furthermore, relief from a judgment is still available
pursuant to the remedies in use before adoption of Rule 60(b).
Rule 60(b) is based upon the Federal Rule 60(b) with respect
to which it has been stated:
"Since the rules have been in force, decisions have
been rendered that the use of bills of review,
coram nobis, or audita querela to obtain relief
from final judgments is still proper and that
various remedies of this kind still exist although
they are not mentioned in the rules and the
practice is not prescribed in the rules" (Clark
Bardman, Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts, p. 668)."
Thus,

the

time

limitations

of

Rule

60(b)

conclusive of the matters now before the court.

are

not

So long as

Chipman has acted within a reasonable time, the court clearly
has jurisdiction to consider these matters. The injustice and
unconscionability

which

are

resulting

from

the

judgment

require that the court take action to relieve defendants from
the judgment as it now stands.
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CONCLUSION
Since

the

lower

court's

order

was

based

on

its

determination that it was without jurisdiction to consider
Chipman's motions because they were filed more than three
months after the judgment was entered, it is necessary to
determine if those motions can be considered by the court
under any rule or authority which is not restricted by the
three-month

limitation

of Rules

60(b)(1)-(4).

The most

obvious authority to consider such motions are the provisions
of Rules 60(b) (5) , (6) and (7) which are not restricted by the
three-month

limitation.

Because

the

stipulation

is so

confusing, ambiguous, incomplete and unconscionable, it is
clear that the minds of the parties have not met and there is
no agreement which can be enforced.

Besides the numerous

inconsistencies in the various provisions, the lack of an
adequate description of the property to satisfy the statute of
frauds and the unfairness of a "compromise" which penalizes
Chipman more than double the amount of a default judgment, had
such been taken, the parties cannot even agree on which
document constitutes their "agreement." Richins contends the
agreement is in a document which is unsigned by anybody,
appears nowhere in the file, and has not been seen by Chipman,
its attorney, or the court, which is supposed to have approved
the stipulation.

An agreement which does not exist or has

these other failings and deficiencies is unenforceable and
void and the judgment on which it is based is likewise void.
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Rule

60(b)(5),

therefore,

is

clear

authority

for

the

consideration of Chipman's motions.
The nature of the alleged stipulation carries its gross
inequities into the future for nine years.

Whatever any of

the parties may have thought about the stipulation at the
beginning, the

realization, after the

fact, that

it is

inequitable and is not what the court or the parties intended,
makes it clear that it is no longer equitable that the
resulting

judgment

have

prospective

application.

Rule

60(b)(6), therefore, also grants the authority to consider
Chipman's motions.
The

further

question

of

ineffective

representation,

whether or not it is true, brings this case within Rule
60(b)(7), according to the decided cases on that point.
Furthermore, Rule 60(b)(7), by its words alone, was intended
to provide the basis to justify relief when no other ground
can be found.

The purpose of that rule is to accomplish

justice and it, along with all of the rules, are to be
liberally construed for that purpose.

Rule 1(a).

It is perhaps less obvious but a careful reading of Rule
60(a) shows that the kind of oversight or omission that
appears in this case may be corrected by the court at any
time.

It is clear from the record that the court did not

intend, and would not have approved of, the result of the
stipulation in this case.

Rule 60(a) provides the authority

to grant the relief sought without any time restriction.
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There is further authority to grant the relief sought in
this case in the inherent power of the court to set aside or
reform judgments for the purpose of administering justice as
well as in the various remedies in use before the adoption of
Rule 60(b) which have survived that adoption.

That inherent

authority has been used to grant relief in cases very similar
to this case and should be used again, if necessary, to
administer justice.
Injustice has been done in this case.

The court has

sufficient authority both under the rules and within its
inherent power to do justice to entertain Chipman's motions
and to grant the relief sought. The lower court was in error
in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction.

That

decision should be reversed and this case sent back with
instructions to set aside the stipulation and judgment or to
reform them to remove the unconscionability and the ambiguity.
DATED this 16th day of July, 1990.

Respectfully submitted,
BACKM&N. CLARK & MARSH

Ralph J. Marsh
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
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CO
C£3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
**********

DENNIS J. RICHINS and
SUESANN RICHINS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PET BERT CHTIMAN
D. RAY CHTIMAN,
RICHARD PORTER,
and JOHN DOES 1

& SONS CO., INC.,
individually,
KENNEIH PORTER,
throu^i 10,

CRCER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS M3EICN
TO b-JLKlKE UKFJdOanS CEHiM^'
CHEEMAN & SCMS. INC. AND D. RAY
QUIMAN'S MJTICN TO EMFCRCE
TEBMIMMrrnNr nv TiR^SE H1RSUANT TO
SmPIAiTICN, IN COURT CR, IN THE
AITEERNA33VE, TO SET ASIDE CR TO
REFCBM gEIHJIATICW
C i v i l No. CV87-1076
(Judge Boyd L. Park)

Defendants.
**********

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants1 Motions for lack of
jurisdiction under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure came on
for hearing before the Honorable Boyd L. Park on the 8th day of June,
1989.

Plaintiffs v/ere present in person and represented by counsel of

record, James R. Brown, Esq., of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & Dunn.
Defendants Delbert Chipman & Sons, Inc. and D. Ray Oiipman were present
and represented by counsel of record, Ralph J. Marsh, Esq., of Backman,
Clark & Marsh.

Defendants Richard Porter and Kenneth Porter were not

page 2

present, but were represented by counsel of record, George A. Hunt, Esq.,
of Sncw, Christensen & Martineau.

The Court hearing oral argument by the

respective parties and being fully apprised in the premises and for good
cause appearing, it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the Defendants Oiipmans1
Motions are properly under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and must be brought within three months after the judgment was
entered.

Defendants Oiipmans1 Motions were not filed within the three

month period and this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the motions.
It is further,
ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

and

DECREED

this

Order

Striking

the

Defendants1 Motions is a final order from which an appeal lies, if any
party desires to appeal.

,

DATED this .s^E^Tday of-Sepfcaxibes, 1989.

L. Park
District Court Judge

